Qubes Canary #22
We have published Qubes Canary #22. The text of this canary is reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying signatures will always be available in the Qubes Security Pack (qubes-secpack).
View Qubes Canary #22 in the qubes-secpack:
https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/canaries/canary-022-2020.txt
Learn about the qubes-secpack, including how to obtain, verify, and read it:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/
View all past canaries:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/
---===[ Qubes Canary #22 ]===---
Statements
-----------
The Qubes core developers who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:
1. The date of issue of this canary is January 13, 2020.
2. There have been 56 Qubes Security Bulletins published so far.
3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:
427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494
4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).
5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
two weeks of April 2020. Special note should be taken if no new canary
is published by that time or if the list of statements changes without
plausible explanation.
Special announcements
----------------------
None.
Disclaimers and notes
----------------------
We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently
compromised. This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers
or services which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in
particular, software updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO
downloads.
This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other
means, like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce
us to produce false declarations.
The news feeds quoted below (Proof of freshness) serves to demonstrate
that this canary could not have been created prior to the date stated.
It shows that a series of canaries was not created in advance.
This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to
anybody. None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible
for any of the statements made here.
Proof of freshness
-------------------
Mon, 13 Jan 2020 11:12:28 +0000
Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
The U.S. Versus Iran: A Dangerous New Era in the Middle East
Germany Plans to Repatriate Ebola Patients
Can Nuclear Power Offer a Way Out of the Climate Crisis?
Killing of Iran General Soleimani Akin to War Declaration
Dissendent Describes 'Cultural Genocide' Against Uighurs
Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
Seven Days in January: How Trump Pushed U.S. and Iran to the Brink of War
Desperate Residents Ignore Dangers of Philippine Volcano and Return Home
A New Home for French Socialists, on Paris’s Periphery
A Growing U.S. Base Made This Afghan Town. Now It’s Dying.
Iran Cracks Down as Protests Over Downing of Airliner Grow
Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Taal volcano: Lava spews as 'hazardous eruption' feared
Iran plane downing: Canadian PM promises 'justice' at memorial
Hevrin Khalaf: Death of a peacemaker
Retired Pope Benedict warns Francis against relaxing priestly celibacy rules
Egypt-Ethiopia row: The trouble over a giant Nile dam
Source: Reuters: World News (http://feeds.reuters.com/reuters/worldnews)
'Oust Uncle': Thailand's jog for dissent signals new breed of activists
Britain's royal showdown: queen hosts Meghan-Harry crisis talks
Iran protesters take to the streets in third day of demos over plane
Australian prime minister's approval rating goes up in flames
Thai elephants march in silence for Australian bushfires
Source: Blockchain.info
0000000000000000000444803ca23cffb65ea59fb0afef4065b2ea897a03e120
Footnotes
----------
[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this
canary in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures
on the corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]
[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures!