Editor’s note: An earlier version of this post mistakenly contained the text of an older canary. This has been corrected below. As always, we encourage readers to verify the cryptographic signatures on canaries, which can always be found in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack).

We have published a new Qubes canary. The text of this canary is reproduced below. This canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures will always be available in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack).


                    ---===[ Qubes Canary 034 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is March 02, 2023.

2. There have been 87 Qubes security bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

       427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123  F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
   Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
   backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the last
   fourteen days of May 2023. Special note should be taken if no new
   canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
   without plausible explanation.


Special announcements
----------------------

None.


Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.

The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.


Proof of freshness
-------------------

Thu, 02 Mar 2023 09:45:31 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Dubious Alliance: How Present Is the Far Right in Germany's New Peace Movement?
Kaja Kallas: Estonia's High-Profile Prime Minister - a Star in the Making
The Special Tribunal Debate: "An Arrest Warrant Against Putin Would Be Immense"
The War in Ukraine: China Is Reportedly Negotiating with Russia To Supply Kamikaze Drones
Volodymyr Zelenskyy's Heroes: Ukraine's Best Respond to the Earthquake in Turkey

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
How Russia Lost an Epic Tank Battle, Repeating Earlier Mistakes
Kyiv Sends Reinforcements to Besieged Bakhmut
Bola Tinubu Elected to Be Nigeria’s Next President
Video: How an Israeli Raid on a Safe House Ended With Civilians Killed
Bola Tinubu’s Victory Extends His Party’s Time in Power in Nigeria

Source: BBC News - World (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
Greece train crash: Angry protests erupt after disaster
India PM Modi urges G20 foreign ministers to overcome differences
How fake copyright complaints are muzzling journalists
Whiskey fungus lawsuit forces Jack Daniels to halt building project
Indian guru's fictional country attended UN events

Source: Blockchain.info
000000000000000000037ab2816f3100fc37acee47a63571b5d3b7ca72145906


Footnotes
----------

[1] This file should be signed in two ways: (1) via detached PGP
signatures by each of the signers, distributed together with this canary
in the qubes-secpack.git repo, and (2) via digital signatures on the
corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/pack/

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/